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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. HAROLD MITCHELL, 
Res:pondent, 
vs. 
ARROWHEAD FREIGHT LINES, LTD., ) 






To avoid any possible confusion, we call the court's 
attention to the fact that in quoting the evidence, ref-
erence is made to the transcript pages at the bottom of 
the page and not the reporter's pages numbered at the 
top of the page. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by the plaintiff, J. Harold 
Mitchell, for the purpose of recovering for personal in-
juries sustained by him arising out of an automobile 
accident which occurred April 3, 1947, about 2:15 P.M. 
on U. S. Highway 91, south of Beaver, or about fifteen 
miles north of Paragonah, Utah, at a place called Muley 
Point. ·The highway was a two-lane asphalt road, nine-
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teen and a half feet in width exclusive of the graveled 
shoulders two and a half to three feet wide. (Tr. 388) 
A dust storm had developed, and the defendant, Marvin 
C. Van Patten, a truck driver, was driving a truck and 
trailer of the co-defendant, Arrowhead Freight Lines, 
Ltd., in a southerly direction following a Buick four-door 
sedan, driven by Charles S. Pace of Payson, Utah, at-
tached to which was a small boat trailer. Van Patten 
had so followed the Buick through the dust storm for 
some two miles on a slight down grade at a very slow 
rate of speed, about 10-15 miles per hour {'Tr. 425, 411). 
In following the Buick through the dust area, Van Patten 
would have to hold the truck back to stay behind (Tr. 
441). He came to a long straight of way where it ap-
peared the dust was clearing, and he could s.ee down 
the highway a sufficient distance, so that he thought he 
had a good opportunity to pass (Tr. 426, 446). Se·eing 
no northbound cars app-roaching, he pulled out to the 
left to get into position to pass and had barely pulled 
up to about the middle· of the boat trailer attached to 
the Buick (Tr. 424-5) when he saw plaintiff's 1946 pick-
up Chevrolet truck driven by plaintiff Mitchell coming 
from the opposite direction crossing the highway diagon-
ally from west to east ( Tr. 425-7). The evidence is not 
certain as to the distance plaintiff's truck was then away, 
but there were varying estjmates of from 100 feet (Tr. 
462) to 100 yards (Tr. 427, 458). Pace estimated the dis-
tance at from 25 to 50 yards (Tr. 471) ahead of his Buick, 
which would probably figure out about 100 to 175 feet 
between the front of defendant's truck and the front of 
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plaintiff's pick-up. Plaintiff denied that he was at any 
time on his ,, ... rong' side or that he had com.e from the 
"~est side of the high"'"ay (Tr. 237). He claimed to be 
stopped or stopping on the east side of the highway (Tr. 
237). \'an Patten, upon seeing plaintiff's truck, immed-
iately attempted to stop (Tr. 430) and swung his equip-
ment abruptly to the east, entirely off the improved por-
tion of the highway. Plaintiff also headed his small pick-
up continuing across the paved portion and across the 
east shoulder and out into the barrow pit, where the col-
lision occurred, the vehicles hitting at an angle, so that 
the left front of the Mitchell truck hit the right front 
corner of defendants' truck ('Tr. 430-2.). See also plain-
tiff's Exhibit \T. The small Mitchell truck swung around 
to face southeast parallel with the larger truck, just 
enough to turn the small truck around ('Tr. 440). Se·e 
plaintiff's Exhibit T. (Also Tr. 460-1). 
The evidence is not entirely clear as to how far east 
of the highway the point of impact was, the distance vary-
ing from three to four feet east of the paved portion (Tr. 
395) to as far as ten or fifteen feet (Tr. 429). One esti-
Inate was fifteen feet east of the center line (Tr. 454-5), 
which would be around five or six feet east off the paved 
portion. 
The following diagram, which is a photostatic copy 
of defendants' Exhib~t 6, illustrates some of the testi-
mony, including the position of the trucks to the east of 
the highway where the collision occurred. 
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The rectangle, n1arked 'Yith the figure ±, illustrated the 
position and direction of the l\1itchell truck 'vhen first 
seen by \ .. an Patten and Pace (Tr. 460, 44'6, 447). The 
three rectangles together east of the highway shown 
fifteen feet from the center line were illustrative of de-
fendants' truck, marked with a figure 1, plaintiff's truek 
marked by the figure 2 (to illustrate in what manner 
the trucks came together), and the rectangle marked with 
the figure 3 is the position of plaintiff's truck wh'jr·e it 
came to rest (Tr. 435). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit T is a photograph introduced in 
evidence by plaintiff, which shows the position of p~lain­
tiff's truck with respect to defendants' truck as it came 
to rest. The picture is also illustrative of the point of 
impact on the small truck, that is, plaintiff's truck on 
the left front ('Tr. 436). See also plaintiff's Exhibit V. 
The plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, was fifty-one years 
of age at the time of the accident. His occupation was 
that of a school teacher, having been so engaged at Saf-
ford, Arizona for twenty-four years (Tr. 232). Before 
the accident, he had arranged to terminate his connec-
tions with the Safford Sehool District as of July 1, 1947 
(Tr. 332). His salary at the time of the accident as super-
intendent was $4800.00 a year. There were 1250 pupils 
under his supervision from kindergarten to the twelfth 
grade (Tr. 233). He owned a ranch and farm in or near 
Parowan, Utah~ and had jntentions of getting the ranch 
into op.eration and then resuming his occupation as a 
school teacher, running the ranch on the side (Tr. 359-
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60). He had no intention of returning to Safford either 
before or after the the accident (Tr. 354-5). 
Follovring the accident, he was taken to the hospital 
Bt Cedar City, where he was under the care of Dr. L. V. 
Broadbent for thirteen days. The general nature of plain-
tiff's injuries as testified to by Dr. Broadbent were a 
fr,'l.ctured rib ( Tr. 205), fractures of the lower jaw, one 
simple fracture near the point of the chin (Tr. 200) and 
compound comminuted fractures on both sides of the 
lower jaw ( Tr. 200). Other general injuries consisted of 
moderate concussion (Tr. 194, 211), a badly cut left ear 
(Tr. 192), swelling about the face (Tr. 209), some hemor-
-rhage about the ·eye ( Tr. 210), small lacerations requir-
ing one or two or three stitches (Tr. 212) and shock (Tr. 
213). There was also loss of several upper teeth, later 
necessitating the use of an upper plate . 
. A.fter the thirteen days, he left the hospital, spend-
ing the next few days in and around Parowan, returning 
to Safford, Arizona, April 22, 1947. There he was in 
hed for a week or two (Tr. 245, 280) and was treated 
u.ntil May 16th by Dr. F. W. Butler, his family physician, 
leaving Safford June 3rd, the following month, for Paro-
wan, where he has lived since. In Salt Lake, he "\Vas at-
t.ended by Dr. K. L·. Dedekind, oral surgeon, and Dr. 
W. Les· W arhurton, who took care of his teeth inserting 
an upp·er plate. He received no other medical treatment 
except a few visits to the office of Dr. Paul ·s. Richards 
in Bingham, Utah, between June 18, 1947, and July 2, 
1947 (Tr. 512). He was also examined by Dr. Reed Clegg 
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on January 15, 1948, and April_20, 1948, just preceding 
the trial. The testimony of these physicians, and the 
nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries will hereafter he 
discussed in greater detail. Suffice it to say here that 
the principal complaint at the time of the trial was some 
(or as was described by Dr. Clegg "n1oderate") limita-
tion of motion ·of the j~aws and neck; other,vise the evi-
dence showed that he had overcome, or was overcoming, 
his injuries, but plaintiff testified as to his tnen present 
inability to do the hard physical work on his farm. 
Annuity tables, combined with the American Ex .. 
perience of Mortality or Life Expectancy tables, were 
offered and received in evidence over defendants' objec.. 
tions. The jury returned a verdict in favor o.f plaintiff 
and against both defendants on the first cause of action 
0f $18,691.72 general.damage, plus $1,638.50 special dam .. 
age, on the second cause of action $1,2:64.00 making a 
total verdict of $21,594.22. 
Both defendants have appealed from the judgment. 
ASSIGNMENTS O·F ERROR 
Errors in Relation to the Annuity Tables 
The court erred : 
1. In admitting 1n evidence the· annuity tables 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit X) over defendants' repeated ob .. · 
jections to said tables and the entire line of such evi .. 
dence, based upon the grounds that they were incom .. 
petent, irrelevant and immaterial, insufficient founda .. 
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tion laid, and specific ohjectjon the form of such ~evidence 
as offered by said exhibit, and that the entire line of 
such evidence and some of the questions and answ·ers in 
relation thereto assumed facts which were not in evi-
dence. (Tr. 405, 418, 410, 411~ 412, 541). 
2. In denying defendant~' motion to strike said 
tables. (Tr. 541.) 
3. In giving instruction No. 22 ( Tr. 79), excepted to 
( Tr. 546), which effectively told the jury to use such 
tables and in connection therewith, failing in any way 
to qualify the mortality table used in connection with 
said Exhibit X. 
4. In instructing the jury by its instruction No. 17 
that plaintiff was ''entitled to contpensation for his 
actual loss of p1ast ·Barnrings, if any, and for the impair-
ment of earning capacity * * * in the future," (Tr. 75), 
excepted to (Tr. 545). 
5. In refusing to give defendants' requested in-
struction No.15 (Tr .. 100) withdrawing the annuity tables 
from the jurors' consideration; excepted to ( Tr. 54 7). 
6. The court erred in overruling (Tr. 31), Para~ 
graph 2 (i) of defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's 
amended complaint (Tr. 27) relating to special damages 
in the nature of wages paid on the ranch. 
Errors as to other Instructions 
The court erred : 
7. In giving its instruction No. 6 (Tr. 63) excepted 
to (Tr. 544). 
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8. In giving its instruction No. 7 (Tr. 64) excepted 
to ( Tr. 5±4-5). 
9. In giving its instruction No. 8 (Tr. 65) excepted 
to ( Tr. 545) . 
10. In giving its instruction No. 10 ( Tr. 67) ~excepted 
to (Tr. 545). 
11. In refusing to g1ve the latter part of defend-
ants' requested instruction No. '6 (Tr. 90) excepted to 
(Tr. 546). 
12. In refusing to give defendants' requested m-
struction No. 9 (Tr. 94) exeepted to (Tr. 547). 
13. In refusing to give defendants' requested ln-
struction No. 18 (Tr. 103) excepted to (Tr. 547). 
14. The com·t erred in denying defendant~' m.otion 
for a new trial (Tr. 118-119; 152). 
) 
We have briefly stated the assignments of error 
particularly relating to the instructions of the court for 
the reason that the instructions complained of are here-
inafter set forth in greater detail. We have grouped the 
assignn1ents so that those relating to the annuity tables 
can be considered together, and those relating to the 
court's instructions on negligence and contributory neg-
ligence can be considered in a sep~arate group. 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 TO 6 
Error in Admitting Annuity Tables 
The trial judge r~efused to permit us to argue the 
question of admissibility or propriety of the annuity 
tables (Plaintiff's Exhibit X) as to form, eind overruled 
our repeated objections to their introduct~on in evidence 
based upon the several grounds hereina-bove stated. It 
was acknowledged these objectionf; s.hould go to the 
entire line of testimony (Tr. 411, 412, 416), and all of 
defendants' objections were renewed in the form of a 
motion to strike the annuity tables, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
X (Tr. 541). 
This court in Rauley v. McCarthy, (Utah) 184 
Pac. ( 2) 123, apparently realizing the misuse of these 
tables in many cases and the vicious ·eff,ect they usually 
have upon the jurors, placed a definite reBtriction upon 
the use of such tables, as follows : 
·''We wish to make it clear that we do not 
hold that in every case where permanent injuries 
are alleged and evidence in suppoTt thereof is 
introduced, that the mortality and annuity tables 
are admissible. We go only so far as to hold that 
where the injury alleged and proved is perman-
ent and is of such nature as to indicate a perman-
ent materia:l impairment of a substantial nature 
in the earning capacity of the plaintiff, the mor-
tality and annuity tables are admissible.'' 
Therefore, in the instant case, we have pr~esented 
the question as to whether there was evidence to support 
a finding not only that plaintiff's injuries were perma.-
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nen.t, but such as to prove "a perrnwnent imp,airment of 
a S1J,bstart~ttial nature in the earning cap~acity of the plain-
tiff." Other objections to the particular tables used in 
this cast~ are raised in this appeal. 
THE PLE-6-t\..DINGS 
In tae instant case, while plaintiff by his pleadings 
claimed that his injuries would render him unable to 
carry on his duties as a school teacher {S-ee paragraph 
5 of plaintiff's amended complaint, Tr. 21), he did not 
claim that his earning capacity was perma;rn.ently im-
paired in connection with the op~era.tion· of the ranch, 
but in substance alleged by paragraph 11 of the amended 
complaint, that it wa.s necessary to ·employ other parties 
to perform some of the work, and by reason thereof 
suff.ered loss of earnings to the then amount of approxi-
mately $3,000 ( Tr. 23) . 
It is also significant that plaintiff, by his pleadings, 
based his claimed neck injury upon the existence of frac-
tures in the vertebrae, as follows : 
''·That by reason of the fracture and injury 
to his cervical vertebra, plaintiff suffers from 
stiffness in the neck and pain upon motion * * * 
that the injuries to his neck and nervous system 
may he permanent in character." 
As we · shall see from the eviden0e, any possible 
fracture of the neck or cervical vertebra, as testified to 
by Dr. Butler (which was the reason plaintiff probably 
believed he had a broken neck) was entirely disproved 
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by plaintiff's own witnesses, Drs. Broadbent and Clegg. 
If not, it was clear tha.t any possible fracture or even 
chip fracture (which Dr. Clegg indicated could have 
been a possibility) had entirely hBaled, and there would 
be no disability due to fractures. Plaintiff himself ac-
knowledged he did not require any particular treatment 
as to his claimed neck injuries ( Tr. 346-7). 
THE EVID·ENCE 
The only lay testimony as to plaintiff's inabHity, if 
any, to teach school was plaintiff's answer to his coun-
sel's question: 
'' Q. Would you he ab[e, from a physical stand~ 
point, to carry on your vocation as a school 
teacher or s-chool sup,erintendent at the pres-
ent time~ 
* * * 
A. I wouldn't want to try to continue my school 
work at the ~p~r"<e:sent time. 
Q. Why~ 
A. I just simply feel like I couldn't handle it 
this year." ( Tr. 332) 
He was paid for the full school year, ending July 1, 
1947 (Tr. 354-5). He was taking part in activities in the 
community, and had been teaching a Sunday School class 
for about two months and singing in a choral group for 
about five weeks (Tr. 353). 
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L\..s to the ranch nnd his activities in connection there-
\Yith, h~e testified: 
"I had intended to come to Parowan where 
n1y farm property 'vas, farm and ranch property, 
and to, first of all, get that in condition so that 
it "\vould operate properly, and then, if condi-
tions arose whereby I could continue my school 
work, I had always expected to do that.'' (Tr. 359-
60) 
''I have a farm and some livestock range, 
the farm itself consists of what they call thirty 
and a quarter acres of water; that acre, however, 
calls for about 1.8 hours of water from the po:r 
tion of the stream that comes down the Parowan 
Canyon. * * * You can irrigate on that, most any 
season, two to two and a half times that much 
land. * * * I have about 98 acres at the p-resent 
time that I'll attempt to irrigate this summer. 
* * * As to grazing lands, I have pastures there 
in the valley, and winter grazing set-up over in 
the north ·end of the valley, privately owned, and 
some public domain, then I have approximately 
fourteen hundred acres of summer grazing moun-
tain land, eight to ten miles south of Parowan.'' 
(Tr. 333) 
He further testified that in connection with this ground, 
he ran sheep and cattle. During the past year, he paid 
his brother wages, $150 a month, to operate the ranch 
and farm, ('Tr. 333) from June until the 2nd day of 
Deeember, 1947 (Tr. 334). He (plaintiff) was person-
ally able to do very little ranching or farming work up 
until December of 1947. Since that time, December, 
1947, there has been very little to handle, just a few 
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chor·es to do during the winter time. Now spring is 
opening up, there is real work down there. ''At the 
present time, my father has been helping a little, and 
my son has been helping.'' ( Tr. 334) 
He testifi,ed to being able to do the chores and sub-
stantially all of the work around the farm and take care 
of the farm, except the heavy work like hoisting grain 
and things of that kind. He was able to manage the farm 
(Tr. 353). 
H·e could drive an automobile in pretty good shape, 
although he had some difficulty in turning to look to 
the rear ; that at the time of trial, he was engaged in 
farming; that he was then unable to do ''strenuous physi-
cal work, I cZon't ·do that well." He could drive the trac-
tor, although he wouldn't undertake to drill grain (Tr. 
248). ''I can ride horses, trusty horses, all right, if I 
take it easy. * * * I don't usually get them off the walk.'' 
That he has some pain and discomfort when he attempts 
to lift heavy objects (Tr. 249). That. he was unable to 
pitch hay without some pain· (Tr. 250). 
He said his ribs had entirely cleared up; that he had 
no dizziness; that his headaches have dimi~ished quite 
considerably, although they were still with him; that his 
breathing was "quite definitely cleared up." (Tr. 344) 
That he didn't require any particular treatment as to his 
claimed neck injuries ( Tr. 346-7) . 
Plaintiff was the only lay witness to testify regard-
ing his condition. 
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~IEDICAL TESTIMONY 
DR. L. V. BRO·ADBENT 
Dr. L. 'l. Broadbent, the attending physician at 
Cedar City took x-rays of the skull and javvs, Exhibits 
E and G, (Tr.197-8), an x-ray, Exhibit F, of the jaw after 
the jaw was wired (Tr. 202), and x-rays of the should~rs 
· and ribs, Exhibits I and J (Tr. 204-5). The x-rays show-
ed a fractured rib and fractures of the lower jaw as 
heretofore described. Treatment for the most p·art con-
sisted of reducing the fractured jaw and wiring the 
jaws into position and suturing the left ear. He further 
testified that after wiring the· jaws, there was ·good 
alignment and good apposition with respect to those 
fractures (Tr. 205). 
With respect to the x-rays of the cervical.spine, he 
said: "I was unable to demonstrate to my satisfaction 
that there was a fracture to· the back bone or cervical 
vertebra. * * * I didn't find any. The positions of align-
ment were good. * * * I was looking particularly for a 
fracture in that area, but I couldn't demonstrate one. 
(Tr. 217) Damage to tissue· causes pa1n; they repair 
themselves.'' ( Tr. 218) 
As to the ear, he stated that the blood supply would 
regenerate and that the ear was then well attached (Tr. 
220-21), a slight scar remaining behind the ear. (Tr. 194) 
There was no skull fracture. (Tr. 223) He left the hospi-
tal April 16th after thirteen days, and never returned for 
further treatment. (Tr. 209) No opinion was expressed 
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by Dr. Broadbent regarding the permanency of plaintiff's 
. . . InJuries. 
DR. F. W. BUTL·ER 
'The testimony of Dr. F. W. Butler, plaintiff's per-
sonal physician, was taken by deposition at Safford, Ari-
zona, March ·6, 1948, and read at the trial. He testified 
to having treated plaintiff April 22nd to May 16th, his 
last visit. (Tr. 281) His general description of the in-
juries is much the same as that of Dr. Broadbent. (Tr. 
261-2) He said that plaintiff was at home up to May 4th, 
but that he was able to. come to the office for the next 
appointment May 9th. (Tr. 280) He took x-rays, plain-
tiff's Exhibits B and C, May 9, 1947. Exhibit B was an 
incomplete exposure. Exhibit C related to the cervical 
vertebra. Exhibit A of the frontal sinuses was taken 
May 16th. (Tr. 261) 
Dr. Butler's testimony differed from that of the 
other doctors in that he gave as his opinion that Exhibit 
C showed ''a fracture in the body of the first cervical 
vertebra'' and ''a comminuted chip about one-fifth the 
size of the body of the first cervical vertebra." (Tr. 269, 
282) He then gave as his opinion, based upon the exist-
ence of the fractured vertebra, that the i~jury to the neck 
would be of a permanent nature, and that there would 
''be some limitation of motion there * * * limitation of 
motion in all spheres, side, lateral, up, down, back-all 
spheres of motion.'' (Tr. 271) He had op·erated on plain-
tiff for an appendectomy about two weeks prior to the 
accident. (Tr. 277) And had previously treated plaintiff 
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for gall bladder trouble the preceding },I arch. ( Tr. 278-9, 
286) That the last treatment 'vas rendered by him May 
16, 19±7. (Tr. 281) That plaintiff finished all his regu-
lar routine 'vork before leaving Safford June 3rd. (Tr. 
283) That he made a \vonderful recovery-he would not 
say a complete recovery, but he made a remarkable come-
back. (Tr. 284) That with reference to the vertebra, he 
did not ever have him wear a Forester collar. (Tr. 284) 
In fact, if there was a fracture, the condition had healed 
to the extent that he did not think a collar was neces-
sary, and if it had healed that much in that three weeks 
period, it would continue to heal. That he believed plain-
tiff would continue to get better right along, except that 
he was not qualified to exp.ress an opinion as an expert 
on nerve injuries. (Tr. 285) 
On re-direct examination, Dr. Butler summed up 
his opinion as follows: '~Well, I had still in my mind 
that the last time I saw him he had this limitation of 
motion in his neck and he had pain in his jaw and quite 
a lot of nervousness.'' ( Tr. 287) 
DR. K. L. DEDEKIND 
~fr. Mitchell came to Dr. K. L. Dedekind July 2, 
1947, for dental surgery and an x-ray was taken. (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit D.) Dr. Dedekind stated there were 
no teeth damaged in the lower jaw (Tr. 172), and two 
of the rear lower teeth were infected by pyorrhea not 
caused by the accident ( Tr. 172, 181-2). There were 
nine of the up·per teeth with respect to which there was 
no evidence of injury (Tr. 172). 'The remaining upper 
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teeth, however, were not adequate to support a denture 
very well (Tr. 173). It was decided to remove all of the 
upper teeth and insert a complete upper plate (Tr. 173). 
'That during the healing processes, he would be incon-
venienced by not being able to eat as formerly (Tr. 176). 
That ordinarily fractures of that type repair themselves 
(Tr. 182), and on July 2nd, when he examined Mr. 
Mitchell, he found them repaired at that time, and that 
they were ''solid and well u~i ted.'' ( Tr. 183) When the 
x-rays were taken July 2nd, he noticed some restriction 
in the ability of Mr. Mitchell to open his mouth (Tr. 186-
187), and further stated: ''There may be fractures where 
a good union would be achieved and the jaw would be-
come solid again, and yet there would he a restriction 
upon the motion of the jaw * * * depending upon the 
position and ·extent of t:Q.e fracture." (Tr. 188) 
DR. W. LES W ARBURTO·N 
Dr. Warburton's testimony was not materially dif-
ferent from that of Dr. Dedekind. He testified to semi-
ankylosis of the jaw at the time of his first examination 
July 22, 1947. With reference to that time, he further 
testified that his mouth was pretty well healed-"in the 
healing process, almost complete." (Tr. 370) A com-
plete upper denture was installed October 14th. (Tr. 
376) 
DR. REED CLEGG 
The testimony of Dr. Reed Clegg, orthopedist who 
\Vas used by plaintiff for the purpose of physical exam-
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inations January 15, 1948, and Ap-ril 20, 1948, just be-
fore the trial, for the purpose of determining plaintiff's 
then physical condition summarizes the extent of plain-
tiff's injuries on those dates. He took numerous x-rays 
and stated that his findings disclosed the following: 
(1) A healed fracture of the left mandible ; (2) Absence 
partial teeth; (3) Healed scar of the left ear; ( 4) Area of 
anesthesia about the left ear and left side of the chin; 
( 5) Healed rib fracture, seventh on the left side ; ( 6) 
Anklyosis or limitation of motion, partial fibrous of the 
cervical spine or nee~; (7) Apparent healed fracture of 
the nasal bone, with deviation of nasal symptom to the 
left; (8) Anklyosis, partial fibrous slight of left thumb 
in the opponens direction; and (9) Anklyosis p:artia1 
fibrous temporal mandibular. (Tr. 290-291) As to the 
x-rays he took, Dr. Clegg "testified that plaintiff's Ex-
hibit Q, x-ray of the chest, indicated there may have 
been a fracture of the seventh rib. (Tr. 292-3) Exhibit 
P, a side view of the cervical spine, part of the 1eft jaw 
and skull, showed no abnormalities but a roughened area 
on the jaw may possibly have been a fracture. (Tr. 293-
4) Exhibit 0, jaw bone, showed a roughened area indi-
cating a healed fracture. ('Tr. 294) Exhibit N, left hand, 
definitely no abnormalities. ( Tr. 294-5) Exhibit M, front 
and back view of neck, showed no abnormalities. (Tr. 
295-6) 
Dr. Clegg was then shown plaintiff's Exhibit C, 
which was the x-ray taken by Dr. Butler at Safford, Ari-
zona. The only possible evidence of fracture he could 
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detect from that exposure was what he described as ''an 
area of roughness in front or anterior to the first cervi-
cal vertebra," (Tr. 296) which "might be the result of a 
chip fracture.'' (Tr. 297) 
Dr. Clegg then gave as his opinion with respect to 
the jaw that there would be ''some permanent limitation 
. ' 
of the motion," (Tr. 298) and as to the neck, "I would 
expect there would be some limitation of motion.'' (Tr. 
299) 
That in the opinion of Dr. Clegg was the full ex-
tent of any possible permanent injuries other than a 
small area of anesthesia in the vicinity of the lower rib. 
(Tr. 301) 
Upon being asked whether the condition of the body 
and neck would have a tendency to p·roduce pain, he said, 
"It might." (Tr. 302) 
On cross ·examination Dr. Clegg further testified: 
'' Q. Would you explain to the jury what 'ankylo-
sis' means, Doctor~ 
A. The term, 'ankylosis,' merely means limita-
tion of motion, may he partial or complete. 
Q. It is used in lieu of the term 'stiffness', is 
it not~ 
A. Yes, similar. · ( Tr. 303-4) 
Q. Now, with respect to the x-rays you have 
examined, I believe you indicated that the 
only possible fracture you could observe as 
to the cervical vertebra was a chip, fracture~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. So, fron1 your examination of those x-rays, 
you ,,~ould conclude there was no fracture 
in the vertebra itself-that is, in the body 
of the Yertebra or into the joint~ 
.... ~. I couldn't see any, no, sir. 
* * * * 
A. There is some bony roughness which may 
represent a healed chip fracture. 
Q. A healed chip fracture~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Will a healed chip fracture ordinarily result 
in any stiffness or limitation of motion~ 
A. Not necessarily from the bony changes, no, 
sir. 
Q. Ordinarily you wouldn't expect any limitation 
of motion by reason of that~ (Tr. 305-6) 
A. Not from the bony changes. 
Q. So that, so far as the hones are concerned, 
there is no fractures you have been able to 
locate which should, in any way, restrict the 
movement of Mr. Mitchell's neck~ 
A. That is, as far as the hones are concerned, 
yes, sir. 
With respect to the tissues of the neck, Dr. Clegg 
testified: 
Q. And tissues and fibrous tissue in the neck, 
Doctor, tends to repair itself, does it not~ 
A. There is general improvement, but there may 
be permanent limitation. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. There may he~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Whether there is going to be permanent 
limitation in a particular case is a rna tter of 
speculation, is it not, Doctor~ 
A. Yes, sir ; yes, sir. 
Q. Just pure guesswork~ 
A. Well, we don't term it that. (Tr. 309) 
Q. But it is speculation~ 
A. It is speculation. 
Q. As to how he is going to be in the future? 
A. Based on experience. 
Q. But the normal thing is for that tissue to re-
pair itself and the patient to imp~rove~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That tissue to build itself up again and be-
come strong~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, during your practice, Doctor, have you 
treated many patients with neck injury in-
volving damage to the fibrous tissue~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And most of them fina'lly regain the full use 
of their neck, do they not, or substantially 
so? '('Tr. 310) 
A. Depending on the extensiveness of the in-
jury, they do. 
Q. People you have so treated have been people 
doing comparatively hard labor' 
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Q. Their neck becomes strong, and they return 
to their occupations and go through life, 
sometimes just about as good as they did, 
or as well as before, do they not~ 
A. I would say by far the majority do. 
Q. Yes. And if, assuming, Doctor, that Mr. Mit-
chell, on or about the 15th day of January 
of this year, which was, I believe, the very 
day you examined him, stated at that time 
that his neck was getting better, improving, 
you would normally expect that that neck 
would continue to do so, would you not~ 
A. I think so. 
Q. And it would gradually improve· and become 
better~ · 
A. I think so. 
(~. And might become entirely well, so far as 
that neck injury is concerned~ 
A. Might.· 
Q. Now, the same would be true as to these 
fractures of the jaw, would it not, that the 
soft tissue of the jaw which is damaged, bones 
which were damaged, they would normally 
tend to restore themselves, would they not~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And whether or not there be any - you 
couldn't state for any certainty as to whether 
or not - well, I belive you stated, Doctor, 
there might be some permanent loss of motion 
there, that there might be~ 
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A. If I said, 'might', I should have said stronger; 
I don't think there is much question about it, 
there will be some limitation; you can't say 
a hundred per cent sure, but I don't think 
there is much question about it. 
Q. And the extent of that disability would be a 
matter of pure speculation, however, wouldn't 
. t OJ 1 . 
A. Yes, there is always variations.'' (Tr. 311-
12) 
DR. PAUL S. RICHAR·D·S 
Plaintiff came to Dr. Richards June 18th, about 
two and a half months after the accident, and made some 
repeat visits until July 2nd following. (Tr. 512) In open 
court, he ·examined all of the x-rays of the neck, Exhibit 
A taken by Dr. Butler, Exhibit C by Dr. Butler, Exhibit 
F by Dr. Broadben1t, Exhibit P by Dr. Clegg, five x-rays 
of the cervical spine, defendants' Exhibits 1 to 5 
inclusive, all of which he testified were entirely negative 
as to any fracture. (Tr. 513-519) Based upon the history 
of the case and an examination of a;ll of these x-rays, 
he concluded there was no fracture of the cervical verte-
bra. (Tr. 519) 'He also stated as his opinion that so far 
as the bony structure was concerned, ''the ultimate out-
come should he no permanent or partial disability.'' 
('Tr. 521) As to what progress the damage, if any, to 
the. soft tissues had made in the meantime, he reserved 
his opinion due to the fact that he had not seen Mr. 
Mitchell since July 2, 1947, (Tr. 521) but went on to say: 
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''I can tell the court this that in my opinion, 
at the time of my examination, I felt definitHly 
that this man would improve and provided he 
\vas under adequate supervision, provided the 
man was diligent in his own endeavor to improve, 
then I \vould expect he had marked improvement 
over \vhat I found at the time of my examination 
in July of 1947. 
'' Q. And what would you say, Doctor, as to what 
he should do by way of diligence or activity 
in order to improve that condition~ 
A. Well, I felt he should immediately go out 
and engage in a definite therap·utie policy of 
keeping himself entirely occupied and physi-
cally active. 
Q. And does that activity tend to repair that 
condition in the neck, or make it well~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Improve that condition~ 
A. J es, sir." (Tr. 522) 
Then on re-direct examination 1n ans"'\ver to Mr. 
White's questions, he stated: 
''A. !1y opinion, following the injury this is to 
early to try to ascertain permanent disability. 
This man can suffer ev·erything you state and 
still he only in a partial temporary disabled 
condition. (Tr. 524) 
Q. How much time should elapse from the time 
of the accident before you could determine 
whether he had a permanent restriction of 
motion in the neck~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
A. If the condition was fixed at a certain point~ 
Q. Yes. (Tr. 525) 
A. I would say at least two years. 
Q. Then after two years you think you could 
make a pretty safe judgment as to whether he 
would be permanently injured, or not~ 
A. Provided the patient had been under proper 
guidance.' ' ( Tr. 526) 
DR.A.K. WILSON 
Dr. A. K. Wilson, an experienced radiologist, went 
over each and every x-ray in the case relating to the cer-
vical vertebra and gave as his opinion that there was 
nothing that he would consider a fracture of the cervi-
cal vertebra (Tr. 489) and nothing as to the bone condi-
tion of the neck which could restrict motion. ( Tr. 490) 
That the vertebrae were all in good alignment and ap-
position. ( Tr. 481-4'95) 
LACK O·F EVIDENCE 
From the foregoing, it is seen that the doctors 
could only speculate whether there was a permanent 
injury to the neck and jaw of plaintiff. ·The most that 
can be said is that there might be some limitation of 
motion, which Dr. Clegg described at the time of his 
examination as moder-ate, but proof of permanent injury 
is not proof of ''a permanent material impairment of a 
substa;ntial nature in the earning oap~ac~t'vy of the plain-
tiff." 
1. None of the doctors testified that plaintiff would 
be unable to p·erform the duties of a school t·each·er, or 
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that he would be unable to carry on the operations of his 
ranch. 
2. There was no evidence that plaintiff would be 
permjWYbemtly unable to carry on his activities in the teach-
ing profession. 
3. There "\vas no evidence that plaintiff would have 
taught school for his full life expectancy, and further-
more, the State la'v allows retirement at ages fifty-five 
and sixty after fifteen years of service. (Sec. 75-29-44, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943). 
4. While plaintiff testified that he was at the time 
of trial unable to do the strenuous physical work, his 
testimony was uncorroborated by any medical testimony, 
and there was rn;o testimony that he would· be unable to 
do hard physical work permanently. 
5. If plaintiff was physically able to engage in 
strenuous physical work before the accident at the age 
of fifty-one years after tw·enty-four years of teaching 
school (and there was no actual evidence on that matter), 
there was no evidence that he w;ould have been physically 
able to .engage in that type of work ·dwring ·his full life 
expectancy 10{ 20.20 years. 
6. No evidence that plaintiff would not have hired 
some hands for the hard physical work on the farm, not-
withstanding the accident. 
7. No evidence that the operation of the ranch or 
farm was an asset or a liability or that there was any 
earning capacity in connection with the operation of the 
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ranch, especially as to a school teacher without practical 
farming experience. 
8. It was not even proven by any evidence that 
plaintiff's income, if any from the ranch, would be less 
even though he hired some help, because by spending 
more time to good management, his capacity to earn 
may ha:ve been gre·ater. 
9. 'There was no evidence that plaintiff's earning 
capacity would be less while teaching school and man-
aging the ranch, as was his intention, than it would be 
if he did all the strenuous physical work. 
It was error to permit the jury to consider the annu-
ity tables in connection with plaintiff's teaching profes-
sion, first because of the ·entire lack of any ·evidence that 
he would permanently he unable to teach (the only state-
ment on the matter being plaintiff's statement that he 
did not feel up to it that year); second, even had there 
been any evidence, it was error to permit the jury to 
consider the matter from the standpoint of plaintiff's 
full life expectancy from the dat·e of the accident, ( 20.20 
years)' when he was actuailly paid in full to July 1, 1947, 
and contemplated discontinuing his school work when he 
got the ranch and farm going. He would then be fifty-
two on September 15, 1947; nor could it he assumed that 
he would teach the balance of his life exp·ectancy up to 
the . time of his death, nor beyond the retirement age of 
fifty-five to sixty years. 
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As to the ranch, the total insufficiency of the evi-
dence to establish that plaintiff sustained any permanent 
loss of ·earning capacity of a substantial nature in con-
nection therewith is apparent in that in order to so find, 
first, it is necessary to assume or infer from the evidence 
that plaintiff had an earning capacity in connection 
therewith (the opposite might be the conclusive pre sump~ 
tion in the case of a school teacher, fifty-one years of 
age, without farming experience) ; second, if it be as-
sumed that he had an ·earning capacity, then as to the 
strenuous physical work, it would have to be inferred or 
assumed from the evidence that he would peTmanently 
be unable to perform the same; inferred that he was 
able 'to do the hard physical work before the accident; 
inferred that if he could so do, he would have continued 
to be physically able to do the strenuous manual work 
during his full life expectancy; further inferred that he 
would not, during the full term of his life expectancy, 
have hired the hard manual work done anyway. :Then, 
if each of those inferences were resolved in favor ·of 
plaintiff, it would have to be inferred from those infer-
ences that the earning capacity as to the ranch would 
be greater by doing the strenuous physical work himself 
rather than hiring it done. That, too, would be insuf-
ficient under the facts in the instant case because plain-
tiff intended to occupy himself as a school teacher and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
manage the ranch. It would, therefore, further have to 
be inferred that plaintiff's earning capacity would be less 
while teaching school and managing the ranch, (which 
would consume his full time) than it would be by himself 
doing the strenuous physical work; and so to reach the 
ultimate fact, it is necessary to construct inference upon 
inference. 
F AIL·URE TO· SUSTAIN BURDEN ·OF PRO·OF 
The burden of proving by competent and actual 
evidence that plaintiff sustained "a permanent material 
impairment of a substantial nature in his earning capa-
city" rest~ed upon plaintiff. That burden is not fulfilled 
where it is necessary to pryramid inferences or base in-
ference upon inf·erence to reach the ultimate conclusion. 
Utah Fownrky & Maehime C'o. v. Uta~ Gas & Coke C,o,., 
42 Utah 533, 131 Pac. 1173; Karr-ern v. Biair, 63 Utah 344, 
225 Pac. 1094; Prentice P~acking & StO'naf}le Co. v. United 
Pacific Insurance Co., (Wash.) 106 Pac. (2) 314; Goodloe 
v. ~o-Mar D'airies Co., ·(Kan.) 185 Pac. (2) 158. 
In McC,affrey v. Schw~artz, (Pa.) 132 Atl. 810, the 
Pennsylvani~ Supreme Court refused to p·ermit use of 
annuity tables where there were too many uncertainties 
involved. The court pointed out that, among other things, 
the jury's attention should he called to the fact that a 
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man's earning power naturally decreases as his life ap-
proaches its end, and that is particularly true "of the 
manual laborer, but it also applies in a less degree to 
the av-erage brain worker.'' That statement is partic-
ularly applicable to the instant case in that it would be 
highly improbable that Mitchell would be capable of 
doing the strenuous physical work clear through to the 
end of his life expectancy or his natural death. 
OBJECTIONS AS TO FO·RM 
The following is a copy of the .table, or plaintiff's 
Exhibit X, as offered and received in evidence: 
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EXHIBIT X 
CASE NO. 81886 
J. HAR~OLD MITCHELL VS. ARROWHEAD FREIGHT LINES LIMITED 
AND MARVIN C. VAN PATTEN 
Computations of P:fiesent Value of Various Monthly Income 
At Various Rates, Age 51, Life Exp,ectancy 20.20 Years 
Based on Am·erican Exper[ence Mortality Table 
(242 Months or Periods Used in Computations) 
RATES PER ANNUM 
3% 4% 5% 6% 
ANNUITY 








----------$ 189.92 $ 185.60 $ 181.41 $ 173.42 $ 165.92 $ 152.26 $ 140.18 
---------- 1,899.24 1,855.96 1,814.05 1,734.16 1,6.59.17 1,522.58 1,401.80 
---------- 4,748.09 4,639.90 4,535.13 4,335.39 4,147.93 3,806.45 3,504.51 
---------- 9,496.19 9,279.80 9,070.26 8,670.78 8,295.86 7,612.90 7,009.02 
---------- 18,992.37 18,559.59 18,140.53 17,341.56 16,591.72. 15,225.80 14,018.05 
---------- 37,984.75 37,119.18 3·6,281.05 34,683.12 33,183.45 30,451.60 28,036.09 
---------- 56,977.12 55,678.76 54,421.58 52,024.69 49,775.17 45,677.41 42,054.14 
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... -lttention is called to the fact that the table, being 
based upon 20.20 years of life expectancy, was in such 
form that the jurors \Yere bound to assume that plaintiff 
would live his full life expectancy, it being impractical or 
impossible for them to make any other use of the table, 
and the court gave no qualifying instructions to i:he jury 
as to the use, if any, the jurors could or should make 
\Yith reference to the life expectancy. 
The court in P.auza v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 231 
Penn. 577, 80 Atl. 1126, held that when mortality tables 
are entered in a personal injury action, it is the duty of 
the judge to carefully guard the eff·ect to. be given them 
by the jury, and that: 
''Unless this is done in a very pointed and 
direct way by the court, the jury may be misled 
as to the value and w·eight to be attached to this 
character of evidence. The important fact for the 
jury to determine is the life expectancy of 
the injured party. This depends more upon his 
prior state of health, character, and habits, perils 
of employment, personal characteristics and other 
circumstances surrounding his own life, than :it 
does upon the average expectancy of other lives 
based upon mortality tables. The trial judge 
should instruct the jury that these tables are not 
to be accepted as establishing the expectancy of 
life of the injured party, but only as an aid in 
arriving at what the expectancy might be in 
view of all the conditions surrounding the partic-
ular life in question. It is not sufficient to instruct 
the jury that the tables are some aid, but not con-
clusive in determining the life expectancy of the 
injured party. All the circumstances affecting 
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the probable duration of life disclosed by the 
evidence should be called to the attention of the 
jury in order that they may have an intelligent 
understanding of what their duty is in determin-
ing the life expectancy in the particular case sub-
mitted to them. '' 
Similarly holding that the court should not leave the 
jury to infer from instructions that mortality tables are 
to serve as an absolute standard, but must give adequate 
qualifying instructions, see : 
McCaffrey v. Schwiartz, ('Pa.) 132 Atl. 810; 
Bowman v. Coyle. (Kan.) 2'60 Pac. 643 ;. 
Vicksburg & Merid~am R. Co., Pl. in error v. Israel 
P~utman, 118 U. S. 545, 30 L. Ed. 257; 
Morrow v. M,erndleson, (Cal.) 58 Pac. ( 2) 1302; 
Scott v. Sheedy, 102 Pac. (2) 575; 
Cornell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (Mont.) 187 
Pac. 902. 
The court, by its instruction No. 22 (Tr. 79), in effect 
instructed the jury to unqualifiedly make use of the table 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit X) in awarding damages as follows: 
''If you find the issues in favor of the plain-
tiff on the question of liability and if you like-
wise find from preponderance of the evidence that 
p1laintiff has suffered an impairment of earning 
capacity and as a result thereof will suffer a loss 
of future earnings as a proximate result of his 
injuries, the damages resulting from a loss of 
such earnings would not be the total of the 
amounts he would thus lose in the future, but 
would be the present cash value of such t~otal. 
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''The total loss of future earnings, if any, 
mu.st be reduced or discounted on the basis of a 
fair rate of interest or return on said sum. It is 
for you to determine from the evidence what rate 
of intenest or return could ~airly be expect-ed from 
a safe investment which a person of ordinary pru-
dence, but 'vithout any particular financial ex-
perience or skill, could make, ·and reduce or dis-
aoun.t the total swm at such fair 11ate of interest 
0 r return ·as you thus me·termine. '' 
From the parts underscored, the jury would natur-
ally assume that they were to use the table. While some 
qualification with respect to the use of the annuity table 
was given in the following instructions, No. 2·2-A (Tr. 80), 
the jury was misled and no qu·alification of any shape 
or form was given to the life expectarncy tables. 
The table in the form offered assumed facts which 
wer.e not proved by the evidence. ( Tr. 541). There was 
certainly no evidence of loss of $300 per month, or $200 
a month, or any other sum, and the court should have 
granted defendants' motion to strike the specified fig-
ures, and at least limited the table to such figures as 
there was evidence to sustain them. Plaintiff might just 
as well compile a table up to $500 or $1,000 a month, and 
figure that if the jury knocked down the amount two-
thirds, that he would obtain a verdict based on $300 a 
month, or approximately $50,000. 
We heretofore called attention to the pleadings and 
pointed out the insufficiency of plaintiff's allegations 
as to any loss of earning cap·acity in connection with the 
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ranch. By the allegations of the amended complaint, we 
were lead to believe that plaintiff was claiming speciai 
damages by reason of wag·es paid in the amount of $3,000. 
We therefore demurred specially by paragraph 2 (i) 
(Tr. 27) of said demurerr, asking that plaintiff be more 
specific as to such claim. Had the court sustained the 
sp~ecial demurrer, as it should have done, plaintiff would 
have thereby been required to be specific about what 
his actual claims were as to the ranch and the wages paid, 
or whether he was in fact claiming anything by way of 
''p,ermanrent imp,airment ~of e1arning oap1acity'' in con-
nection with the. ranch, a question which is not yet clear 
in this case, either from the pleadings or the evidence 
introduced. For that reason, we have claimed error in 
connection with the ruling on our special demurrer. 
Another development is important in this connection. 
The only evidence of wages paid was $.150 a month to 
plaintiff's brother from June to December 2, 1947, or 
approximately $900. At the conclusion of the evidence, 
when counsel saw the court was going to leave the an-
nuity tables in evidence, he very shrewdly told the court 
that he withdrew his claim of wages paid the brother. 
While his action in so doing does not specifically appear 
of record, he will not deny the matter, as it is evident 
from the instructions given by the court on special dam-
ages that the $900 item was eliminated because the it~m 
of specia:l damages r·elating to the second cause of action, 
$1,2;64, ('Tr. 116) was damage to plaintiff's truck, and the . 
item of special damage in the verdict of th.e first cause of 
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action, $1,638.50, (Tr. 116) (see also the court's instruc-
tion No. 18) (Tr. 76) consisted solely of hospital, medi-
cal and traveling expenses and incidental damage to 
personal property. While no complaint would normally he 
made as to counsel's withdrawing the item of $900 in 
\Yages, it is evident that his purpose in so doing was to 
confuse the jury as to the difference between claimed 
special damages for wages paid plaintiff's brother on the 
ranch with permanent loss of earnilng capacity. That 
this probably did so confuse the jury is evident from the 
verdict based on $16,591.72 (an exact figure from the 
table) or $100 per month for plaintiff's life exp:ectancy, 
and the approximate amount plaintiff was paying his 
brother during the first year, that is about $900 for about 
nine months. 
When the total verdict was $21,594.22, it takes no 
stretch of the imagination hy reference to the table, to 
see that the jury arbitrarily selected the figure $16,591.72 
from the four per cent column in the fifth line providing 
for $100 per month for the full life expectancy. As four 
of the last five figures are identical, or figuring it another 
way, when the claimed special damages of $1,638.50 and 
$1,264.00 are added to $16,591.72, the total is exactly 
$2,100.00 less than th·e total verdict. The affidavits of the 
jurors received in p.roof of the quotient verdict showed 
that as to the $2,100.00, $1,200.00 was for pain and suf-
fering, and $900.00 wages paid hy plaintiff to his brother 
for services on the farm June to D·ecember 2, 1947. 
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After the jury was instructed, we took exception 
(Tr. 545) to the court's instruction No. 17 (Tr. 74-5) as 
a whole, and also to specific parts, including that part 
'vhich told the jury that the plaintiff is entitled "to 
compensation for his actual loss of p·ast ea)rnilngs, if any, 
and for impairment of earning capacity, if any." When 
we called attention to this error, counsel for plaintiff 
turned down ~the offer of the court to call the jury back to 
have the instruction corrected, and elected to take his 
chances. The fact that the jury in its verdict allowed $900 
for the past damages paid plaintiff's brother, plus $16,-
591.72, .or $100 per month for his full life exp.ectancy, 
showed the harmful effect of this error and the misuse of 
the annuity tables. 
It should be noted that the reason or grounds for 
admissibi~ty of the annuity tables is quite different when 
a death is involved and earning capacity is thereby end-
ed or in an instance such as that which existed in Brwner 
v. McC~arthy, et ·al, 105 Utah 399, 142 Pac. (2) '649, where-
in a h·elper on the railroad, whose duties included putting 
coal in the engines, sustained the loss of a leg, or in the 
Pauley case (wherein the court expressed doubt as to 
the sufficiency of th·e evidence governing their admis-
sibility, where there was expert m~dical testimony that 
there was fifty per cent disability of the leg for hard 
work, twenty-five per cent disability in the left foot and 
twenty-five per cent disability of the right hand and 
another doctor testified that injured was not able to go 
hack to work as a trainman for the· railroad. 
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In Schlatter v. illcCarthy, et ial, (Utah) 196 Pac. (2) 
968, this court aptly pointed out ~that the situation may 
differ \Yhen various occup~ations are considered. 
We submit that the use of the annuity tables should 
not have been permitted in this case, because of the lack 
of evidence of permatnernt impairment of earning capacity 
of a substantial nature; that in any event the table used 
was not in proper form; that the jury was not given 
proper or adequate instructions; and that errors were 
committed prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair 
. and impartial trial on the measure of damages. 
ASSIGNniENTS OF ERROR NOS. 7 TO 13 
The usual issues of negligence and contributory 
negligence were involved in this cas~e. Defendants 
pleaded by their answer in substance that defendant's 
driver was reasonably misled in that there was an ap-
parent opportunity to pass, but plaintiff suddenly and 
unexpectedly came from the west side of the road across 
the center line and immediately in front of defendant's 
truck, creating an emergency. That the collision was 
solely caused or proximately contributed to by the negli-
gence of plaintiff in the following particulars: 
''(a) In approaching traffic coming from 
the opposite direction on his wrong side of the 
highway and in suddenly and unexpectedly creat-
ing an emergency by turning across the highway 
immediately in front of such opposing traffic. 
'' (b) In failing to keep a reasonable and 
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p~roper lookout and particularly in failing to keep 
a proper lookout for automobiles and traffic ap-
proaching from the opposite direction. 
"'(c) In failing to keep said Chevrolet truck 
under proper, immediate and safe control. 
'' (d) In failing to exercise reasonable and 
ordinary care to avoid a collision." 1Tr. 37-38). 
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO·. 7 
The court erred in giving verbatim plaintiff's re-
quested instruction No. 1 (Tr. 108). ·se-e the court's 
instruction No. 6 (Tr. 63) as follows, to-wit: 
''You are instructed that the defendants have 
admitted in their answer and it is undisputed in 
the evidence that the defendant Arrowhead 
Freight Lines, Ltd., was the owner of the truck 
and trailer which collided with plaintiff's truck 
on April 3, 1947, that the defendant Marvin C. 
Van Patten was the driver of said truck as the 
servant, agent and employee of the defendant 
Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., and was acting 
within the course of his employment. 
"You are further instructed that the defend-
ant Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., is l~able for 
any negligent acts or omissions, if any, of its ser-
vant Marvin C. Van Patten, committed or omitted 
by him in the course of his employment.'' 
Defendants duly excepted to the whole of said in-
struction and also specifically excepted to the last para-
graph of said instruction, and further spe-cifically inter-
posed an exception to the word ''liable.'' (Tr. 544). 
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This instruction in unequivocal terms told the jury 
that the defendant, .... \.rro\Yhead Freight Lines, Ltd., was 
liable if there \Yas any possible negligence on the part of 
the defendant, n1arvin C. 'Tan Patten. 
It entirely eliminated proximate cause as a condition 
to recovery. 
It unequivocally eliminated contributory neg·ligence 
as a defense so far as the defendant Arrowhead Freight 
Lines, Ltd. was concerned. 
Clear and palpable error of this kind is not cured by 
other instructions correctly stating the law, because this 
only creates a conflict in the instructions, and it is im-
possible to determine if a jury followed the correct in-
struction. 
See Sorens1on v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 Pac. 72, where-
in the court stated: 
'' * * * True, counsel point to other portions 
of the charge wherein, they contend, the rule re-
specting the burden of proof is correctly stated. If 
that be conceded, it still does not minimize, much 
less cure, the palpable error contained in the fore-
going instruction. At most it would merely pre-
sent a case where two instructions were given 
upon the same subject, one proper and the other 
improper. Where such is the case, and the evi-
dence is conflicting upon the subject covered by 
the instructions, or is such that more than one 
conclusion is permissible, and the record leaves 
it in doubt whether the jury followed the instruc-
tion that is proper or the one that is improp,er, 
then but one result is legally permissible in this 
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court, and that is to reverse the judgment and 
grant a new trial to the aggrieved party." 
See. also Statte v. Green, (Utah) 6 Pac. (2d) 177; 
Martin v. Sheffie~d, (Utah) 189 Pac. (2) 127, and the 
cases hereinafter cited under the court's instruction No. 
7. 
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO·. 8 
Defendants duly excepted to the court's instruction 
No. 7 as a whole, as well as to certain parts of said in-
struction for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. (Tr. 
544-5). The instruction given read: 
"You are instructed that the laws of this 
state provide that no vehicle shall be· driven to the 
left side of the center of the roadway in overtak-
ing and passing another vehicle traveling in the 
·same direction, unless such left side is clearly 
visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a suf-
ficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking 
and passing to· be completely n1ade without inter-
fering with the safe operation of any vehicle ap-
proaching from the opposite direction of any 
vehicle overtaken. In every event, the over-taking 
vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the 
roadway before coming within one hundred feet 
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction. 
''If you shall find and believe from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendants 
operated the Arrowhead· truck and trailer upon 
U. S. Highway 91, and attempted to overtake 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
at a time when ~the left side of said highway was 
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not clearly visible and was not free from oncoming 
traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit 
such overtaking and passing to he completely 
made without interfering with the safe operation 
of the vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction, which was being driven by the plaintiff, 
then you are instructed that such conduct on the 
part of the defendants was neglig-ent and in viola-
tion of the traffic laws of this state; and if you 
shall further find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the collision between plaintiff's pickup 
truck and said Arrowhead truck and trailer, then 
you should find the issues in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants." (Tr. 64). 
The instruction, the last one discussed, was as well as 
erroneous and prejudicial error in that it directed the 
jury to return a verdict ''in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants'' if they found the defendant 
negligent, and ''that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the collision.'' 
Such instructions have repeatedly heen held to be 
reversible error in that they eliminate contributory neg-
ligence as a defense. In other words, an instruction 
requiring a verdict in favor of the plaintiff must state 
all of the conditions essential to recov-ery or the instruc-
tion is erroneous. Nor is the error cured by reason of 
the fact that the law is correctly stated in other instruc-
tions, because where there are conflicting instructions 
it is impossible to say which instruction the jury fol-
lowed in arriving at a verdict. 
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The situation is well illustrated in Beyerle v. Clift, 
(Cal.) (hearing denied by Supreme Court), 209 Pac. 1015. 
We quote: 
''The errors relied upon consist in the giving 
of two instructions to the jury. In each of these 
instructions the court stated certain provisions 
of law defining the duties imposed upon an opera-
tor of a vehicle, and then said: 
'' 'If, therefore, you believe that the defend-
ant violated any of the provisions of the law above 
mentioned at the time of the accident complained 
of in this case, and that such violation was the 
proximate cause of the accident, you should find 
for the plaintiff.' 
''Assuming that the issue of contributory 
negligence was properly before the court, there 
is no doubt that these w~ere erroneous instructions, 
because it is settled law that, if an instruction by 
its terms purports to state the conditions neces-
sary to a verdict, it must state all those conditions 
and must not overlook pleaded defenses on which 
substantial ~evidence has been introduced. 
''The court gave other instructions on the 
subject of contributory negligence, the correct-
ness of which is not challenged. But this is not 
sufficient to overcome the prejudicial character 
of the erroneous instructions. 
'' ' * * * But the giving of these other instruc-
tions simply produce a clear conflict in the in-
structions given the jury by the court, and it is 
impossible for us to say which instruction the jury 
followed in arriving at a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff.' Pie·rce v. Umited Gas & Elec. Co., 
sup;ra, 161 Cal. at page 185, 118 Pac. at page 704. '' 
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In LaRu.e t\ Powell, (Cal.) (hearing denied by Su-
preme Court), ±2 Pac. (2) 1063, the court said and held: 
'' ~The authorities ar~e legion to the effect 
that a so-called ''formula'' instruction must con-
tain all the elements essential to a recovery, and 
the absence of any one of such elements may not 
be compensated for nor cured by a reference 
thereto in other instructions correctly and fully 
stating the la\Y. * * *' We think is obvious that 
the above instruction is fatally defective, and 
although there are instructions inconsistent with 
it we are satisfied they do not corr,ect the ·evil. 
The instruction practically deprives the defendant 
of a trial by jury under the negligence laws of 
the state * * *'' 
' 
In accord see also: 
Sinin v. Atchesovn T. & S. F. Ry. C1o., 284 Pac. 
1041; 
Pierce v. United Gas & Electric Co., (Cal.) 118 
Pac. 700; 
Shell Pipe. Lime Co. v. Robims;on, (lOth C. C. A.) 
66 Fed. (2) 861; 
Bauer & JohnsiO'n Co. v. Nat~owal· R~oofimg Co., 
(Neb.) 187 N. W. 59; 
Birmingham E. & B. R. C., v. Hoskims, (Ma.) 39 
So. 338; 
McVey v. St. Clair Co., (W.Va.) 38 S. E. 648; 
Oklahoma R. Co. v. Milam, (Okla.) 147 Pac. 314; 
J(r~)ena v. United R. R. Co. of S. F., (Cal.) 207 Pac. 
35; 
J.llorse v. Incorp,orated Town of C~astna, (Iowa) 
241 N. W. 304; 
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B.aker v. R~osaia, (Wash.) 5 Pac. (2) 1019; 
PitJtsbu.rgh Cownty R. R. Co. v. H·asty, (Okla.) 233 
Pac. 218; 
Brooks vs. Tha;yer1 C1o., (Neb.) 254 N. W. 413. 
The court's instruction No. 7, given at plaintiff's 
request, was apparently taken from Section 57-7-124 of 
the Utah Code. In addition to the reasons hereinabove 
mentioned, the instruction was erroneous in that it told 
the jury that defendant was negligent as a matter of ZOJUJ 
if he was not successful in completely passing the Buick 
car and also successful in getting completely back onto 
his right side of the road before eoming within one hun-
dred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction (in this case, plain tiff's truck). The instruction 
in that form failed to take into consideration the fact that 
if Van Patten was misled by reason of the fact that 
plaintiff's truck came from the west or wrong side of the 
road in a deceptive dust storm or dust condition, that 
there might be an excuse or justification on the part of 
defendants' driver. In other words, if an emergency was 
created or contributed to by reason of plaintiff's negli-
gence, defendants should not be held negligent as a mat-
ter of law for not being able to successfully pass andre-
turn to his normal position on the highway. · 
In Larng v. Siddall, (Iowa) 254 N. W. 783, it was held 
to he reversible error to instruct the jury that a failure 
on the part of a person operating a motor vehicle upon a 
public highway to give one-half of the traveled part of 
such highway by turning to the right when meeting 
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another vehicle '·constitutes negligence as a matter of 
la,Y," 'vhen it is prima facie negligent. The court said: 
~'The instruction cannot be approved. It is 
erroneous to instruct the jury that as a matter of 
law it would constitute negligence. * * * The jury 
should be told clearly, plainly and correctly the 
rule of la'v pertaining to the so-called law of the 
road under the circumstances, such as are pre-
sented in the case at bar, where it was contended 
that the accident resulted because of the claim that 
the appellant's automobile was on the wrong side 
of the road. * * * The giving of the instruction 
complained of was prejudicial error.'' 
The imposition of a greater duty upon the defendant 
than the law requires was held rever.sible error in Sialtas 
v. Affleck, (Utah) 105 Pac. (2) 17~6, wherein the court in 
practical effect instructed the jury that the defendant 
was required to drive his automobile "using reasonable 
care and prudence so that he could avoid injuring any-
one or colliding with any person upon the highway,'' 
whereas the law only requires one to use reasonable care 
to avoid a collision. The court said such an instruction 
practically required the defendant to avoid a collision 
"with anyone regardless of whether such one were or 
were not guilty of negligence.'' The court further pointed 
out: 
''That part of the instruction failed to take 
into consideration the right of defendant to as-
sume that all other persons upon the highway 
would use ordinary care and reasonable precau-
tion for their own safety until the contrary ap-
peared.'' 
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It has been decided by California in connection with 
a statute, which provided that before turning, the driver 
''shall first see that such movement can be made in safe-
ty, and if it cannot he made in safety, shall wait until 
it can be made in safety," that such statute required a 
reasonable construction and that: 
'' 'Safety' does not mean absolute safety, for 
under that construction a driver intending to turn 
would be required to await the time when no other 
vehicle could possibly be affected in any way by 
such movement. The quoted portion of the section 
should be construed to require that the driver 
see first that the movement could he made in safe-
ty, assuming that both he and others using the 
highway exercise ordinary care. This gives to 
the common sense rule embraced in the section 
a common sense interpretation.'' Inouye v. Gilb~oy 
,Co., (Cal.) 300 Pac. 835. 
This, court in Martin v. Sheffield, supra, recently 
pointed out that the court's instructions should clearly 
set forth the correct "legal effect of defendant's negli-
gence'' if any, -and in reversing the judgment pointed out 
that in the instruction given in that case it: 
''might well he construed by the jury to mean 
that though the jury found negligence on the part 
of plaintiff which proximately contributed to the 
accident, nevertheless plaintiff was ·entitled to a 
verdict.'' 
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DEFENDANTS' R.EQUE;S,TED INSTRUCTIONS 
... \.SSIGNMENT OF ERROR N:O. 11 
The court, by its instruction No. 13, gave the pre-
liminary part of defendants' requested instruction No. 6 
(Tr. 90) as follo\vs: 
"You are instructed that the laws of Utah 
provide that upon all roadways of sufficient width 
a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of 
the roadway, except when overtaking and passing 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
under the Diles governing such movement. 
"It ,,~as, therefore, the duty of the plain-
tiff, J. Harold Mitchell, to keep on his right side 
of the highway at all times, particularly if there 
was or might be traffic approaching from the 
opposite direction.'' 
but there the instruction was ended, without stating the 
legal effects or consequences of plaintiff's approaching 
from the wrong side. The instruction should have been 
completed as requested by defendants to further read 
as follows: 
''And if you find from the evidence that the 
plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, was guilty of any 
negligence in approaching on his wrong side of 
the highway when there was traffic approaching 
from the opposite direction, and that by reason 
thereof, the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten, was 
prevented from seeing said pick-up truck driven 
by plaintiff as soon as he could or would other-
wise have seen it had it been upon its proper side 
of the highway, or that the plaintiff, J. Harold 
Mitchell, was thereby prevented from seeing the 
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truck as soon as he could or would otherwise have 
seen it, and that such negligence on the part of 
plaintiff proximately contributed in any degree 
to cause the collision, then plaintiff cannot re-
cover, and your verdict should be in favor of 
defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause 
of action, even if you should find there was also 
negligence on the part of the defendant, Marvin 
C. Van Patten." (Tr. 90-91) 
Defendants were entitled to have the instruction 
completed so as to explain the legal effects of plaintiff's 
action as constituting contributory negligence, and what 
verdict to return in the ·event they so found. Martin v. 
She !field, supra. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO·. 12 
The court refused to give defendants' requested in-
struction No. 9, as follows: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of 
plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, to avoid creating an 
emergency and also to avoid a collision if he could 
do so in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary 
care. Therefore, if you find from the eVidence 
that the plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, was negli-
gent in failing to take reasonable precautions to 
avoid an emergency or a collision by failing to 
pull off and stop· on the left hand shoulder at an 
earlier time or by negligently getting onto his 
wrong side of the highway when there was traffic 
approaching from the opposite direction, or by 
failing to keep a prop~er lookout or by failing to 
take reasonable and ordinary care to pass between 
defendant's truck and the ca.r driven by Charles 
S. PRce, and that such negligence on his part 
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proxin1ately contributed in any degree to cause 
the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover, and 
your verdict should be in favor of defendants and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, even if 
you should find there was also negligence on the 
part of the defendant, ~I arvin C. Van Patt(~n.'' 
(Tr. 94) 
The whole of this request was refused, the trial court 
endorsing in pencil: ''Covered by No. 8 in substance.'' 
The court's instruction No.8 (Tr. 65) in no possible sense 
of the \Yord covered the matter requested. While the 
court's instruction No. 14 (Tr. 71) indirectly covers some 
of the same subject matter, it did not adequately cover 
the duty of plaintiff to take steps to avoid the collision, 
by the means set forth in said request, and the legal ef-
fects of such as constituting contributory negligence. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 13 
The court refused defendants' requested instruction 
No. 18 in its entirety as follows: 
''You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence that the plaintiff,. J. Harold Mi tche11, 
knowingly drove into a dust storm and continued 
to drive therein at a time when he knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, 
that traffic was or might be approaching from 
the opposite direction, and under such circum-
stances that, as a reasonable person under the 
circumstances, he knew or should have known, 
of the danger of collision with opposite-hound 
traffic on said highway, due to limitrutions of visi-
bility caused by the dust storm, then he was negli-
gent, and if you further find that such negligence 
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proximately contributed in any degree to cause 
the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover and 
your verdict should be in favor of defendants and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, even if 
you should find there was also negligence on the 
part of the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten." 
CTr. 103) 
This requested instruction was justified because of 
plaintiff's claim that he was entering a dust storm or 
area, and that his visibility was substantially obscured 
by reason of the sam·e. Entering a dust storm under such 
conditions could reasonably be found by the jury to be 
contributory negligence. 
The court did in its instruction No. 10 explain plain-
tiff's duty to pull off onto the shoulder and stop if reason-
ably necessary (Tr. 67), but again the court in No. 10 
did not go on to explain the legal ·effects of such failure 
as constituting negligence or contributory negligence on 
the part of plaintiff, to which defendants were entitled. 
ASSIGNMENT OF· ERRO,R NO. 10 
Defendants assigned as error the giving of the 
court's instruction No. 10 for the reasons just mentioned, 
and for the further reason that said instruction under-
took to state that it was the duty of both drivers to drive 
at a reasonable speed and to pull off to the side of the 
highway and stop, if reasonably necessary to avoid dan-
ger ; however, the last paragraph of said instruction reads 
as follows: 
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·'Therefore, if you find from the evidence 
that plaintiff or defendant \.,..an Patten 'vas unable 
to see his true position on the highway and con-
tinued to drive at a speed 'vhich was not reason-
able and prudent under the conditions then and 
there existing, then the on.e violating this duty 
u.:as negligent." (Tr. 67) 
The court by using the underlined clause, inferredly or 
impliedly told the jury that only one of the tvvo parties 
could be negligent in such particulars. 
The la\v is well established that defandants were 
entitled to have the case submitted to the jury on any 
theory justified by their evidence, as well as upon the 
theory of the whole evidence, and failure to so instruct 
the jury on a material issue under defendants' theory of 
the evidence would affect defendants' substantial rights. 
J1o.rgan v. Bingham Stage Lime Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 
Pac. 160; 
Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121,124 Pac. 522; 
Pratt v. Utah Light & Tr. Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 Pac. 
868; 
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893. 
EVIDENCE AS TO PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE 
There was substantial evidence of plaintiff's negli-
gence in the particulars pleaded, and defendants were 
entitled to adequate instructions as to those issues as 
well as instructions correctly defining defendants' duties. 
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Except for some variations as to actual distances, the 
principal conflict in the evidence arose by reason of 
plaintiff's testimony that he was at all times on his prop-
er side of the highway and that he had pulled off onto the 
east of the traveled or paved portion, being just in the 
act of stopping. That plaintiff was in error was. proven 
by the testimony of Van Patten corroborated by Charles 
A. Pace, a disinterested witness. 
MARVIN VAN PATTEN 
Mr. Van Patten tes·tified that the van he was driving 
was thirty feet in length, and. the trailer also thirty feet. 
('Tr. 423). He said: 
"Then I went on up over the ridge and as I 
come to the top of the ridge I could see a· storm 
on the flats. It was dusty and cloudy. I proceed-
ed down off the Beaver Ridge and as I got down 
onto the flats why I come upon a car that was 
pulling a trailer. It was an open two-wheel 
trailer. I followed him for quite some time; I 
would say two or three miles, travelling pretty 
slow. It was p-retty dusty and pretty windy 
and then you would get a break it wouldn't be 
quite so bad and you could see pretty good, and 
I followed him down there. 
''I had to get around him, and on one of these 
breaks in the storm I could see down the road 
far enough to pull up around him, and I proceed-
ed to do that. I started up around and I got about 
halfway along side this trailer when I noticed 
a car coming up from the opposite side towards 
this car I was passing, and just as I seen· him it 
seemed like he crossed the center line, and when I 
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seen him I couldn't get back behind the car I was 
atten1pting to pass, so I pulled completely off the 
road and at the same time he also pulled off the 
road and "\Ye had our collision when "\Ve were com-
pletely off the road. (Tr. 424-5). 
'' Q. When you did that how far could you 
see down the road~ 
"A. Well, I can't be sure on that. I would 
say possibly 200 yards that I could see. I seen 
I had plenty of room to pass or I don't believe 
I would have attempted to pass in the first place. 
The road was plenty clear when you got a break 
in the storm. (Tr. 426). 
"Q. Where did that truck come from~ 
"A. It seemed like he coine from the center 
of the road, or the opposite side, like he just 
crossed over. (Tr. 426-7). 
The truck was then possibly one hundred 
yards away; "maybe not that far-I don't know 
exactly-when I first seen him. * * * I believe I got 
the whole truck and trailer completely off the 
road before we had the collision.'' 
He turned about a forty-five degree angle toward the 
southeast. The other car pulled off the road at the- same 
time. Both trucks were going about the same speed. 
(Tr. 427). He changed gears or shifted into third direct 
when starting to pass. (Tr. 528) 
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''We were completely off the road at the 
time of the impact. * * *I don't know exactly how 
far off it was. I know we were both completely off 
the road. I would say anyway the distance of this 
room, maybe ten or fifteen feet. ( Tr. 42). 
"Q. What did you do, if anything, when you 
saw this other car turning off the highway~ 
''A. I attempted to stop·, and also get out of 
his way at the same time to avoid the collision, 
if I could possibly do it. That is why I turned 
off on the shoulder of the road, to avoid it.'' 
(Tr. 430). 
He didn't believe the pick-up truck went over five or ten 
feet after the impact. It wasn't very far. The left front 
corner of plaintiff's truck came in contact with the right 
front corner of defendants' truck. (Tr. 430-1). 
On cross-examination, Van Patten further testified 
that he was prepared to follow the Buick the rest of 
the way if he had to, but the storm did break from time 
to time. (T·r. 441). It was breaking more· as they went 
along. (Tr. 444). In starting to pass, he went up to 
about twenty miles an hour. Both trucks had their lights 
on. When he got about even with the trailer, he continued 
to look down the highway and could see two hundred 
yards or better. (Tr. 445). He, Van Patten, didn't at-
tempt to get hack into his proper lane because he was 
too far up to do that and he didn't have time to complete 
passing. (Tr. 447). 
There was some confusion as to whether feet or 
yards were meant in stating the distance between his 
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truck and the )litchell truck 'vhen first seen, but he 
finally approximated the distance at one hundred to 
two hundred feet. ( Tr. 458). Prior to seeing the Mitchell 
truck, he could see no vehicles approaching on the high-
'vay proper. (Tr. 459). 
''I 'vas being very cautious and careful as 
I knew how to be. I wouldn't have attempted to 
pass in the first place if I hadn't seen ample room 
to get around, and do it safely enough, I wouldn't 
have attempted to pass in the first place." ('Tr. 
460). 
The borrow pit was not very deep. It was more or less 
level. When he came in contact with the Mitchell truck, 
it swung the Mitchell truck around. ('Tr. 460). There 
were no marks indicating the Mitchell truck had been 
"shoved or pushed forward." It (the sand or dirt) 
was disturbed around there where he had turned after 
the impact. ('Tr. 461). 
'' Q. And yet you didn't see the Mitchell 
car until it came within 100 feet~ 
''A. That is right. 
'' Q. Why, on account of the dust~ 
"A. Well, it was on the opposite side of the 
road. 
''Q. I thought you said it was in the center 
of the road~ 
''A. Yes. I wasn't looking for one there. 
I was looking more or less on the east side. * * * 
I wasn't looking for any on that (opposite) side.'' 
(Tr. 462). 
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It just came out of nowhere. (Tr. 463). 
"Q. You mentioned, Mr. Van Patten, that 
you did not expect Mr. Mitchell to come from the 
west side of the road; is that correct~ 
"A. That is correct." ( Tr . .W6). 
CHARL.ES .A. PACE 
Charles A. Pace, a disinterested witness, testified 
that he was on his way to Lake Mead; that he was travel-
ing in the west lane of traffic ( Tr. 4 70), about in the 
middle of that lane, at about ten or fifteen miles an hour, 
going just about as slow as he could go and still keep 
going. He had been traveling at that speed for quite 
some distance. With reference to plaintiff's pick-up 
truck, he said : 
''Well, it just seemed to come up out of no-
where. Visibility was bad and it just came up all 
of a sudden. It came from the opposite direction. 
I could only give the approximate distance that 
I first saw it. I would say anywhere from 25 to 
50 yards approximately. (Tr. 471) 
'' Q. Where was that truck with respect to 
the center of the highway. 
''A. It was about in the center of the high-
way, or probably straddled on the center, or 
yellow, line of the highway when I saw it. 
'' Q. Had you seen that pick-up truck prior 
to that time~ 
''A. No sir. I didn't actually see the col-
lision.; they hit just back of me. I heard the crash 
but I did not actually see them hit.'' 
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He went back to the scene of the accident. With reference 
to the t\YO trucks, he said: 
''They were both off the highway, down into 
the barrow pit. (Tr. 472). 
''Q. Did you observe the conduct of Mr. Van 
Patten after the accident¥ 
"A. y . es, s1r. 
'' Q. In what manner did he conduct himself¥ 
''A. \' ery gentlemanly, very fine and very 
gentlemanly.'' 
On cross-examination, he said he would judge that 
he had traveled more than a mile through the dust storm. 
'' ~Iy guess would be several miles.'' ( Tr. 478). The dust 
storm did not envelop-e the highway constantly. 
· ''There would be breaks that you could see 
through, and see the pavement ahead; then it 
would fill in and you could not see the pavement 
nowhere. * * * and sometimes it would clear away 
and you could see the highway for some distance 
ahead." (Tr. 47 4). 
When the dust abated, there were sort of gusts of wind 
' and dust. He could not estimate the exact distance of 
visibility. (Tr. 475). 
''It would vary, sometimes it would be a short 
time, sometimes longer." (Tr. 476). 
The pictures identified as plaintiff's Exhibits V 
and P, and the diagram, defendants' Exhibit 6, herein-
above shown in the brief, show that the collision took 
place well east of the paved highway, when viewed in 
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connection vvith the foregoing summary of \l an Patten's 
and Pace's testimony. 
J. HAROLD MITCHELL 
That Van Patten was in fact coming to the end of 
the dust storm and into the clearing is also evident from 
p~laintiff's testimony: 
'' Q. And then you later noticed that the 
dust did clear up to some extent, did you not~ 
''A. That's right; it wasn't, it wasn't entire-
ly regular. ·There were waves, sometimes the dust 
was a little heavier that ·at other times. 
'' Q. In other words, the dust was variable; 
sometimes it was thicker than others~ 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. And about the time you - after you 
waited for this other car to get ahead, and the 
dust had started to clear, as you thought it had 
started to clear, then you started out, didn't you~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. The dust didn't prevent you from see-
ing the line~ 
"A. No." (Tr. 336·-7). 
WILLIAM M. MITCHELL 
William M. Mitchell, plaintiff's father, was riding 
with him and app·eared to be concerned as to whether 
they were on the proper side of the road, as is. shown 
from the following part of his testimony: 
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"Q. About ho'v far ahead of the pick-up 
truck could you see as you proceeded through the 
dust1 
''A. Well, I wasn't looking ahead very far. 
I kept my eye on the shoulder of the road to see 
\Ye were in the road as we went along. 
'' Q. \1lhy were you doing that 1 
'' ~-\.. Because I was little nervous, quite 
dusty, and I la1ew my son \Vas careful driver, 
but, just the same, I ,,~as just little worried for 
fear we would get one side or the other off the 
road." (Tr. 398). 
When it reasonably appeared to Van Patten that 
he was coming into the clearing and from his position 
that he had a reasonable opportunity to pass, it cannot 
be said that he was negligewt as :a mat'ter ~of law in pulling 
up into position beside the trailer. At that point, he was 
confronted with an unexpected or sudden emergency 
by reason of the fact that Mitchell ap·parently through 
his own misjudgment, or being lost in the fog, had gotten 
west of the highway and cut across immediately in front 
of the Pace Buick and defendants' truck. Van Patten 
then did all he could to stop aatd get out of the way by; , 
turning abruptly into the borrow pit. Had Mitchell been 
where he woud normally be expected to be, on the east 
side of the road, Van Patten, although behind the Buick 
and trailer, probably would have seen him before he did, 
and would not have undertaken to pass had he known 
~fitchell was approaching. At least, he may not have 
reached such a position that he could not return to his 
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proper side. Van Patten savvrthe Mitchell truck "\vhen one 
hundred to three ·hundred feet away, and the physical 
facts necessarily bear him out. Therefore, it likewise 
must have been possible for Mitchell to see the same dis-
tance, but he acknowledged not seeing defendants' truck 
until twenty-five feet away. (Tr. 238) Had Mitchell seen 
defendants' truck earlier, he might reasonably have 
avoided the collision. Neither truck was exceeding fifteen 
or twenty miles per hour, and there "\vas twelve, or pos-
sibly tvventy feet, between the center line of the highway 
and where the collision occurr.ed. Had Mitchell seen de-
fendant's truck earlier, or had he been more alert, he rea-
sonably could have turned slightly to the west before the 
collision or stopped sooner. In view of the conflict as 
to whether Mitchell created an emergency, and in view 
of the possible inferences and deductions from the evi-
dence, it was reversible error for the court to instruct 
the jury as it did and refuse to instruct the jury as re-
quested by the defendant. 
MO·TlON FOR NE·W TRIAL. 
Defendants duly moved for a new trial on the 
grounds that the verdict was excessive and upon errors 
in law occuring at the trial, as hereinabove outlined, and 
· misconduct of the jury in arriving at a quotient verdict. 
('Tr. 118). In support of the latter ground, affidavits 
of seven jurors were filed on behalf of defendants. We 
quote the affidavit of Sterling E. ·Tanner, foreman, to 
which six of the other jurors agreed: 
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'~Sterling E. Tanner, being first duly sworn 
on oath, deposes and says: That he is one of the 
jurors and foreman, on the trial of the above en-
titled case, wherein a verdict was returned Mon-
day, April 26, 1948. That the amount of the ver-
dict was determined in the following manner: 
''We first agreed to return a verdict for the 
plaintiff. We then allowed the special damages of 
$1638.50 on the first cause of action, and $1264.00 
on the second cause of action. We then added 
$16,591.72 from the annuity table, plus $900.00 for 
wages paid to plaintiff's brother during 1947. We 
differed as to the amount to be paid for pain and 
suffering, so we each agreed to submit an amount 
on a slip of paper as to the amount, if any, that 
should be awarded. We also agreed to adopt the 
average as our verdict, after including the 
amounts hereinabove mentioned. We each sub-
mitted a figure by secret ballot, and they were 
then handed to me and I added the figures and 
divided by eight, which gave a result of $1,200.00, 
which figure governed our final verdict without 
further deliberation. Adding of all the figures 
was checked by some of the jurors, but there was 
no further deliberation after we computed the 
average of $1,200.00, as to pain and suffering. On 
my slip, I put nothing for pain and suffering, 
but consented to the result because of our previous 
agreement." (Tr. 121-133). 
These affidavits, in clear, concise and unmistakable 
language, showed that the final figure of $1200.00, as to 
pain and suffering was arrived at by quotient verdict. 
As that was the final figure which w·ent to make the final 
amount of the total verdict of $21,594.22, the jurors there-
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by confessed that their final verdict was arrived at by 
quotient or chance. 
While counsel for respondent went back and obtain-
ed counter-affidavits (Tr. 134-149), couched in his own 
language or legal phraseology apparently obtained from 
the case of Pence v. Mining C~o:., 27 Utah 378, 75 Pac. 
934, the jurors having confessed in clear and concise 
terms under oath to the quotient verdict,, their later 
modification was clearly an afterthought to avoid the 
effects of such illegal or quotient verdict. 
The trial court should have granted a new trial 
on account of the numerous grounds herein argued, or 
in any event reduced the verdict to $5,002.50 by eliminat-
ing the figure $16,591.72 on 'the grounds that the verdict 
vvas excessive. 
CONCL U·SION 
The fact that the verdict in this case, exclusive of 
the figure of $16,591.72, adopted from the annuity tables, 
was $5,002.50 (that is $1,638.50 special damages for medi-
cal, hospital, traveling expenses, and incidental property 
damage; $1,264.00, damages to the truck; $900.00, wages 
paid plaintiff's brother; and $1,200.00, for pain and suf-
fering) illustrates their vicious effect upon defendants' 
right to a fair and impartial trial on the issue of damages. 
This is particularly true when the evidence is totally 
insufficient to sustain the admissibility of the tables, 
as it was in this case. It is equally important that even 
when admissible, that they be in p~roper form and not in 
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such form as to be eonfusing or misleading. Proper 
precaution should al\Yays be taken so.that adequate quali-
fying and explanatory instructions are given to the jury, 
explaining the limitations upon their use as applied to 
the actual evidence in the case so that the jurors can ap-
ply them properly and upon a correct theory in rela-
tion to permanent impairment of earning capacity, and 
not in relation to. special damage such as wages, which 
they appeared to do in this case. We submit that the 
tables should have been excluded altogether, but even 
if admissible, that reversible error was committeed as to 
their use. 
As to the instructions on the issues of n-egligence 
and contributory negligence, defendant was likewise en-
titled to have the jury prop·erly instructed and to a fair 
trial upon those issues. 
It also appears from the evidence that the verdict 
is excessive and unreasonable, aside from the errors 
above discussed. 
We resp~ectfully submit that a new trial should be 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNO·N & HANSOjN 
E. F. BALD·WIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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